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The topicality of the paper’s subject “EU accession of the Western Balkan Countries” 
results from the fact that despite the unresolved crises in the EU, in autumn 2019 the EU 
member states will decide whether to open accession negotiations with the Western 
Balkan states of North Macedonia and Albania. Due to doubts concerning the readiness 
of accession of these countries, the discussion on an alternative option for EU integration 
between full membership and non-membership for countries that are only partially ready 
for accession is reviving. The focus here is particularly on economic integration. The 
corresponding objective of the paper is to clarify whether from an economic point of 
view doubts about the accession readiness of northern Macedonia and Albania, as well 
as of the other Western Balkan accession candidates Montenegro and Serbia, are 
justified. The research tasks in this contribution are reflected in the following modules: 
drawing conclusions from evaluations by the EU, a statistical analysis of the economic 
development in the candidate countries, the simulation of convergence processes for 
each Western Balkan state, the evaluation of international country rankings and finally 
the execution of a cost analysis of the EU accession of the Western Balkan states. 
Problematic enlargement plans of the European Union 
In the European Union (EU), which has grown to 28 member states, centrifugal forces 
are becoming increasingly visible: the efforts of the United Kingdom to withdraw from 
the EU, the smouldering economic crisis in Southern Europe, the strong differences in 
refugee and immigration policy, the North-South conflict over the future of the Stability 
and Growth Pact or the controversial question of further deepening EU integration point 
to fundamental differences within the EU. In view of a large number of unresolved 
problems in the current EU, it would be reasonable that the further enlargement of the 
Community will not be on the European policy agenda. Especially the enlargements 
during the last 15 years have made the political consensus building in the EU 
increasingly difficult and can explain the drifting apart of the member states in many 
policy fields. But a new enlargement of the EU is still planned. 
Following their strategy of an Eastern enlargement, in 2004 the EU accepted the majority 
of Central and Eastern European reform states as full members. The accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania (2007) as well as Croatia (2013) completed this enlargement 
process by countries in the Balkans that had been comparatively economically weak or 
politically unstable until then. From the EU's point of view, however, enlargement is not 
yet completed—despite all the integration problems that have come to light. In the 
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“Thessaloniki Declaration” in June 2003, the Western Balkan states of Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Macedonia (Northern Macedonia since 2019), Serbia and Montenegro 
and, with restrictions, Kosovo were also given the prospect of accession. This was 
reaffirmed in the “Sofia Declaration” in May 2018. 
This enlargement project seems to focus less on the enlargement of the EU internal 
market, which is not surprising given the small size and limited economic potential of 
these candidate countries. Rather, it is a project for the political stabilisation of the 
Western Balkans, as can be seen from the highlighted objectives: strengthening 
democracy and the rule of law, fighting crime and corruption, and pacifying regional 
conflicts. The establishment of functioning market economies is seen as a vehicle to 
achieve these goals and also to curb migration from these states to the EU. Therefore, 
the creation of a perspective for young people to stay in the EU plays a special role. 
However, it makes little economic sense to extend the freedoms of the EU internal 
market to countries that are too far from the level of development and competitiveness 
of the present member states. Without a realistic prospect of catching up and the ability 
to survive in the European competition for production sites, the capital inflows needed 
for the modernisation of infrastructure and the business structures will not materialise—
instead, a brain drain is more likely. Moreover, countries that are not ready to join the 
EU would become victims or a ballast as the EU deepens. Member States that cannot 
keep up pace would be destabilised and would depend on permanent alimony. 
Doubtful readiness for accession 
Against this background, the readiness for accession of the four Western Balkan states 
Montenegro, Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Albania, which are the only countries in 
the region to have received candidate status, is analysed. But even these countries have, 
from the EU's point of view, made varying degrees of progress on their way to full 
membership: Only Montenegro and Serbia have started accession negotiations. In 
contrast, accession negotiations have not yet been opened with Albania and Northern 
Macedonia, although the EU Commission had already recommended to the EU Council 
in June 2018 to open negotiations. 
The regular evaluations of the candidates by the EU also point to doubts as to whether 
the four Western Balkan states are ready for accession. Even the better-rated candidates 
Montenegro and Serbia do not appear to be qualified accession countries. The economic 
dynamism and reform enthusiasm that characterises catching-up economies in an ideal 
way are only rudimentarily observed. In all Western Balkan states, fundamental legal 
framework conditions, which characterise the rule of law and are indispensable for the 
functioning of a market economy, have yet to be created or put into practice. The 
candidate countries therefore receive long “to-do lists”, which they would have to work 
through on their way to full membership. In Northern Macedonia and Albania, the need 
for reform appears to be particularly pronounced from the EU's point of view, as the 
even more extensive reform tasks show. 
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These doubts are confirmed by the development perspectives of the candidate countries 
presented in the analysis: The per capita income of the Western Balkan states is only 31 
to 47 per cent of the EU average, which would put the four countries at the bottom of 
the EU wealth hierarchy (Figure 1). But here, too, the Western Balkans do not appear as 
a homogeneous group of countries — Montenegro and Serbia can set themselves apart 
to some degree. 
 
Figure 1:  
Ranking of relative per capita income of EU members and Western Balkan candidate 
countriesa,b 
aGDP at current market prices in purchasing power standard per inhabitant in % of the EU 28 
average; ranking in descending order; values for Croatia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, 
Albania and Serbia estimated on the basis of IMF (2019); Black marked: New EU members in the 
context of the Eastern enlargements of 2004, 2007 and 2013; marked in white: Western Balkan 
candidate countries. – bFor the country codes see Figure 1 of the full version. 
Source: Eurostat (2019a), IMF (2019); own illustration and calculations. 
Development scenarios 
Catching up within the EU 28 means that the relative per capita incomes of the candidate 
countries—i.e. their per capita incomes as a percentage of the average per capita income 
of the EU—would have to rise. This implies that the per capita income of the Western 
Balkan countries must grow faster than the EU average. The catching-up process can be 
regarded as successful if their per capita incomes correspond to the EU average, i.e. the 
relative per capita incomes assume a value of 100 per cent. 
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Four alternative development scenarios were presented in order to get an idea of the 
possible course of this catching-up process of the candidate countries: In addition to 
updating the candidates’ previous development path of relative per capita incomes into 
the future, the development trends of the accession countries Bulgaria, Romania and 
Latvia were used to simulate convergence scenarios. At the time of their accession to 
the EU, these accession countries were at a comparable level of development to the 
Western Balkan states. 
These four convergence scenarios for the Western Balkan states reveal that the duration 
of the catching-up process must be measured after decades due to the current relatively 
low level of development and partially restrained growth dynamics. As a result of the 
economic heterogeneity of the four candidate countries, the development paths 
considered drift very far apart. However, the development paths of the benchmark 
countries under consideration themselves also differ greatly, so that the scenarios as a 
whole cover a relatively large scope for development. Montenegro could have caught up 
between 2036 and 2053, Northern Macedonia between 2042 and 2082, Albania between 
2046 and 2065 and Serbia between 2040 and 2055. 
A catching-up process defined in this way requires that the catching-up countries achieve 
economic growth that is regularly above the EU average. Therefore, the Western Balkan 
states would have to maintain their previous growth rate at least, while Northern 
Macedonia would have to increase it significantly. The convergence scenarios presented 
imply that the candidate countries would have to achieve annual economic growth in the 
3 percent range over decades. However, the sluggish catching-up process of some of the 
previous accession countries shows that EU accession will by no means automatically 
lead to a higher level of growth. For this reason it is worth considering that the Western 
Balkan states should develop their institutional frameworks more ambitiously on their 
own than the EU requires them to do. 
Three international rankings are used to assess how ambitious the candidate countries 
have so far been in adapting their institutional frameworks: Human Development Index 
of the United Nations Development Programme, Worldwide Governance Indicator of 
the World Bank and Ease of Doing Business Indicator of the World Bank. The 
evaluation shows that the four candidate countries' economies and other standards of 
prosperity are clearly lagging behind those of the EU-28, as are obvious deficits in state 
and political structures. Even though attractive investment conditions exist for 
companies in Northern Macedonia, there is also a need for a guarantee of the institutional 
framework through good and reliable government action, which is lacking in this case. 
Conclusions 
If the Western Balkan states, despite their backwardness in development, were to be 
admitted to the EU in the near future, all those involved would have to accept 
disadvantages: The EU would accept new members who would be more or less 
dependent in the long term on structural and investment aid amounting to billions. This 
picture is already evident in the previous accession countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe, which accounted for about half of all fund resources in the 2014 to 2020 funding 
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period and had the highest per capita payments in the EU 28 (Figure 2). Expenditure for 
the Western Balkan states from the EU structural and investment funds would be based 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Per capita transfers to the EU Member States from the European Structural and 
Investment Funds, 2014–2020a,b 
aThe following funds were considered for the funding period 2014 to 2020: European regional 
development fund (ERDF), European social fund (ESF), Cohesion fund (CF), European 
agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD) and European maritime and fisheries fund 
(EMFF) ; black marked: New EU members in the context of the Eastern enlargements of 2004, 
2007 and 2013. – bFor the country codes see Figure 1 of the full version. 
Source: Eurostat (2019c), EU Commission (2019b); own illustration and calculations. 
on the payments for these accession countries. According to a model calculation, the 
transfers to the Western Balkans would have amounted to about 24 billion euros in the 
expiring funding period. This amount would have to be counter-financed by budget 
increases or by cuts elsewhere. In addition, a further deepening of the EU would reach 
the limits of feasibility if the development levels of the member states were increasingly 
spread. The already existing “trade off” between deepening and enlargement of the EU 
would become even clearer. 
The Western Balkan states themselves would also have disadvantages if they had to 
integrate into the European single market without a prior substantial approximation of 
their living conditions to the EU average. Their economic policy would lose degrees of 
freedom by adapting to the regulatory corset of the EU—their fight for investments 
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would become more difficult. The entitlement to various EU transfers would not provide 
an adequate compensation for this, and permanent financial support would even tend to 
hinder development. Furthermore, access to the labour markets and social systems of 
rich member states would significantly increase the risk of a brain drain in the Western 
Balkans. 
Against this backdrop, full membership of the Western Balkan states in the near future 
is not recommended. Since, however, for political and geostrategic reasons, the 
integration of these countries into the EU is desired, an “EU membership light” would 
be worth considering. Integration of the candidate countries could then take place in a 
“multi-speed Europe” in which the level of integration is determined by the 
developmental progress of each individual country. It would not be sufficient for a 
candidate to formally fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. Progress in development could be 
better measured by the relative per capita income indicator—also applied by the EU—
which could be used to align integration steps. 
 
A per capita income at the level of the EU average might be too ambitious to define a 
catching-up target. However, the minimum target should be a per capita income of 75 
percent of the EU average, which, according to EU guidelines, marks the threshold from 
less developed regions to transition regions. If the current pace of development in the 
Western Balkan states were to be maintained, however, even this goal would only be 
achievable in the longer term: Montenegro would reach this threshold in 2040, Serbia in 
2043, Albania in 2045 and Northern Macedonia in 2064. 
 
